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CONTROLLING EMPLOYMENT
PROTECTION OF THE GERMAN SYSTEM OF CONTROL-
LING EMPLOYMENT BY COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
BY RALPH F. FUCHS
I. THE ATTACK UPON STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The success of the post-war German system of regulating em-
ployment by collective agreement, which has been described in
a previous number of the REVIEW, 1 is of course bound up with
the fate of the present German government and economic sys-
tem. Thus far, although wages have been subjected along with
prices and interest rates to regulation by emergency decree, 2
there has been no important change in the permanent structure
of control. Despite considerable opposition, the basic features
of that structure have survived the transition from a social-
democratic to a centrist government. The available figures,
moreover, indicate that mounting unemployment had not, prior
to 1930, diminished the use that was being made of collective
agreements. On the contrary, these played a greater part in
1929 than previously in laying down the terms and conditions
of work. 3 Nor was the strong arm of the government more
prominent than before in maintaining the system, for member-
ship in the unions showed a slight increase 4 and the proportion
IFuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in German Law (1929) 15
ST. Louis L. REv. 1.
" See N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1931, III, 3, 6, and Dec. 27, 1931, IX, 3, 6, for
accounts of the drastic decree which went into effect Jan. 1, 1932.
The following table, supplementing that in 15 ST. Louis L. REV. at p. 45
n. 114, shows the growth in the use of collective agreements during recent
years:
No. of No. of No. of
Date Agreements Establishments Workers
Jan. 1, 1925 7099 785,945 11,904,159
Jan. 1, 1926 7533 788,755 11,140,521
Jan. 1, 1927 7490 807,300 10,970,120
Jan. 1, 1928 8178 912,006 12,267,440
Jan. 1, 1929 8925 997,977 12,276,160
4 Hoeniger, Schultz, & Wehrle, JAHRBUCH DES ARBEITSRECHTS, vol. IX
(1930) 18. For an account of the mounting unemployment, which since
has increased still more, see ibid. 27; Schacht, THE END OF REPARATIONS
(1931) 196. The membership of German unions is understated in 15
ST. Louis L. REv. at p. 45. When unions of all sorts, including those of
employees of public corporations, are added in, the total for 1925 is
8,196,035 out of 21,033,133 employed persons inclusive of domestic servants.
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of truly voluntary agreements rose somewhat in 1928 as com-
pared with previous years.5
Apparently, however, the continued application of control by
agreement has been accompanied by increasing opposition on
the part of employers to one of the compulsory features of the
system. As has been pointed out, 6 the German law gives every
encouragement to the formation of voluntary collective labor
agreements, which are legally enforcible and which may be ex-
tended by the Minister of Labor to apply to labor contracts that
otherwise would not come within their scope. In addition, a
dispute between employers and workers, unless an agreement is
reached, becomes subject to "conciliation" proceedings which in
some instances of especial public importance are initiated by the
government. The outcome of these proceedings, if the parties
cannot be brought to agree, may in the discretion of the official
conciliator or of the Minister of Labor be an "agreement" im-
posed upon the parties, which will have as much force as if it
had been concluded voluntarily.7 Thus the political state to
some extent assumes the responsibility for justice in industrial
as well as other human relations. It does so upon the dual
theory that the German Constitution imposes upon the govern-
ment the duty of safeguarding the interests of workers 8 and that
the public welfare requires the maintenance of industrial peace. 9
The charge has been freely made that the social-democratic
government during its incumbency sought to strengthen itself
with its constituents rather than to serve the interests of justice
by the terms of the "agreements" which it imposed, thus en-
couraging agitation on the part of workers and handicapping
REICHSARBEITSBLATT, SONDERHEFT 36 (1927) 12. Schacht gives the num-
ber of gainfully employed as 33 million, doubtless including public officials
and the professional classes. THE END OF REPARATIONS, 195.
5 Ham, The German System of Arbitration (1931) 15 J. POL. ECON. at
pp. 12-13.
6 15 ST. Louis L. REV. at p. 41.
7 See Ham, op. cit. n. 5 above, for a fuller account of .this feature of the
German system of control.8 Arts. 151 and 157.9 Sinzheimer, Zur Frage der Reform des Schlichtungswesens, RABL.
1929, II, 149-153. Schacht condemns "the dominant theory that it is the
function of the state to care for the maintenance of the individual citizen."
THE END OF REPARATIONS, 35.
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German industry in international competition by an unduly
high level of wages.' 0 In reply it is pointed out that inevitably
industrial disputes, if settled at all, must be settled on a basis
of social policy, and the real question is over the proper policy
to pursue. What the objectors really wish, unless they desire
chaos, is settlements according to their own policy, which the
economic strength of employers in a time of depression would en-
able them to enforce, rather than according to the policy applied
by the government. The latter, it is maintained, is quite capable
of being supported for valid reasons which, while they are
political in the best sense of the term, are by no means political
in the sense of selfish partisan politics." Thus one of the prin-
cipal features of the German system of control of employment
relations has become an important issue in the political arena.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE IMPAIRMENT OF AGREEMENTS
BY THE PARTIES
Meanwhile the recently-established labor courts'12 have pro-
duced a surprising number of reported cases upon all aspects
of labor law,' 3 including collective agreements. It is not pre-
tended that these cases have been exhaustively gone over as a
basis for what follows. Enough have been examined, however,
to show the recent treatment of several questions which relate
to possibly the central problem connected with collective agree-
ments--the problem, namely, of the adequate protection of such
agreements against impairment by outsiders or by the parties
themselves when their immediate interests lead them into sub-
versive activity.14
If an organization of workers or employers desired to evade
the obligations of a collective agreement to which it was a party,
a fairly obvious way of trying to do so would be for the organi-
10 THE END OF REPARATIONS, 187. Ham,.op. cit. n. 5 above.
31 Sinzheimer, op. cit. n. 9 above.
12 15 ST. Louis L. Rnv. at p. 5.
13 A privately published series of reports (Mannheim, 1926 ff.), succeed-
ing the two volumes of decisions of the Reichsgericht in labor cases pre-
viously drawn upon (15 ST. Louis L. REv. at p. 6, n. 18), and devoted prin-
cipally to the decisions of the Reichsarbeitsgericht, had reached ten sub-
stantial volumes by the end of 1930. It will be cited herein as RAG.
1 See op. cit. n. 1 above for an account of the legal remedies which may
be invoked in support of collective agreements.
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zation to disintegrate. It is the view of one commentator that
the Civil Code would continue an agreement after the dissolu-
tion of one of the organizations which were parties to it if that
organization were a registered association. 15 Most German
unions, however, are unregistered,6 and it has been held that a
collective agreement cannot survive the dissolution of a con-
tracting party of this type. In the case in question the action
was brought by a union of newspaper employees to establish the
validity of an agreement which it had with an association of
publishers. The association had had four members but had
dwindled in number to two. One of these tvo, a co-defendant
in the case along with the association, was resisting a wage scale
which had been incorporated into the agreement by the impo-
sition of a conciliation decree. After the labor court had ren-
dered judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant association was
formally dissolved. The Landesarbeitsgericht, when the case
later came before it, adjudged that the agreement and the im-
posed wage scale were in effect until the date of the dissolution
but that they ceased to have either normative or obligatory
force' 7 after the association ended its existence. The decision
of the court below was affirmed by the Reichsarbeitsgericht, but
it was held that it should have been rendered against the indi-
vidual defendant only, since by its dissolution the association
ceased even to be a party to the action.' 8 Whether the courts
would hold a successor association to agreements to which its
predecessor had been a party does not appear, but there seems
to be no obstacle to such a result in the case of unregistered asso-
ciations, whose legal existence in any event is simply the recog-
nition of a fact.
As previously noted,' 9 an effort is sometimes made in advance
to invalidate imposed agreements by inserting a provision into
the constitution of an association specifically denying it the
power to enter into collective agreements. Such an effort will
be unsuccessful in any case in which an organization has the
15 Nipperdey, anno. to 8 RAG. 128.16 3 International Labour Office, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (Studies & Rep.
Series-A, no. 31) p. 37.
'1 See 15 ST. Louis L. REV. at p. 11 for the explanation of these terms.
18 8 RAG. 128 (Oct. 26, 1929).
19 15 ST. Louis L. REv. at p. 32.
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regulation of employment as one of its functions. 20 Hence it is
impossible to have the advantages of collective action without
accepting at least some of its obligations. An imposed agree-
ment-has even been held valid in the case of a registered em-
ployers' association whose constitution explicitly denied it the
power to regulate in any way the employment of the class of
workers covered by the decree, where the fact appeared that the
association actually had concerned itself with the relations of
its members to that class of employees. 21
Occasionally the courts are called upon to deal with a disre-
gard by conciliation authorities of an existing agreement be-
tween the parties to a dispute, which one of them is interested
in avoiding. The important decision of January 22, 1929, de-
claring an imposed agreement which conflicted with an existing
agreement to be invalid,22 was followed shortly afterward in a
case in which an employers' association sought a declaration of
the continued validity of an agreement notwithstanding the sub-
sequent imposition of another. The original agreement pro-
vided for its termination only upon March 31 of any year after
three months' notice, and no such termination had taken place.
The original agreement was held to be still in force. 23
A related situation arises when a party to a collective agree-
ment seeks to evade it by entering into another with an af-
fected party. This is the case, for instance, where a union
forces a particular employer, although he is a member of an
employers' association with which the union has a contract, to
enter into an agreement which is more favorable to its members
than the original one. Undoubtedly its action is a breach of
the original agreement and is redressable as such,24 but the
courts have not held this fact to be determining in ascertaining
which agreement shall have normative force as regards the labor
contracts of the union's members with the employer.25 There is
no applicable legislative provision. In the case just cited 26 the
20 5 RAG. 537 (Apr. 10, 1929).
21 5 RAG. 543 (Apr. 10, 1929).
22 15 ST. Louis L. REV. at pp. 39-40.
2 5 RAG. 411 (Feb. 2, 1929).
24 Nipperdey, anno. to 9 RAG. 601.
25 9 RAG. 88 (Apr. 9, 1930).
21 N. 25 above.
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matter is settled by preferring the agreement which is most re-
stricted in its scope. A stenographer sued for compensation ac-
cording to an agreement which had been extended 27 to apply to
the electrical business in all of Baden. The defendant employer
relied upon a local agreement between the plaintiff's union and
a number of employers' associations, including the defendant's,
which applied to a large number of establishments in different
trades. The Reichscrbeitsgericht held that if there were no
other criterion the geographically more restricted agreement
would control. In this case, however, the Baden agreement ap-
plied to only one line of business and the local agreement to
many, so that the former took precedence. In a slightly later
decision the Reicharbeitsgericht adopted the principle that the
agreement most advantageous to the worker should control ex-
cept where individual labor contracts made explicit reference to
the other 2 8-a holding which seems to place a premium upon
contract breaking by unions. On the same date it was held that
the Minister of Labor in extending an agreement may, if he pro-
vides against its impairment by a subsequent agreement, invali-
date a later contract which conflicts with the terms of the ex-
tended one.29 Shortly afterward it was held that an extended
agreement supersedes the normative provisions of prior volun-
tary agreements. 30 The Collective Agreement Ordinance lays
down its own rule for determining conflicts between two or more
extended agreements. 31 An arrangement between an employer
and a works council, if it introduces terms into the affected labor
contracts that are more advantageous to the workers than those
incorporated into a collective agreement, is effective under the
Collective Agreement Ordinance, which permits variations in
27 See 15 ST. Louis L. Rav. at p. 10 for a discussion of the extension of
agreements.
28 9 RAG. 601 (Jul. 2, 1930).
2D 9 RAG. 599 (Jul. 2, 1930).
30 10 RAG. 363 (Oct. 4, 1930).
31 "When a labor contract comes under several extended collective agree-
ments, in case of conflict that one controls which contains provisions appli-
cable to the largest number of labor contracts in the establishment or sec-
tion of the establishment, unless the Federal Labor Office has provided
otherwise." TVO. sec. 2, par. 2. See 15 ST. Louis L. REv. at pp. 34-36 with
reference to the construction of decrees of extension for the purpose of
determining their scope.
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individual contracts that are favorable to the workers.32 Ob-
viously the decisions in this field are not on a satisfactory
basis. 33 They do not form a coherent body of law, and they do
not encourage good faith on the part of workers.
In the matter of the responsibility of associations, liability of
their members for their breaches of agreement is somewhat
more restricted than was stated in the prior discussion.34 Al-
though it is true that in strict theory the members of an un-
registered association are suable upon its *obligations, this lia-
bility is negatived where the articles of association are incon-
sistent with it. 3 5 Hence the unregistered association, if it
wishes to provide against personal liability on the part of its
members and if it is willing to evaporate upon occasion, may
enjoy a large measure of immunity from legal responsibility.36
III. PROTECTION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS FROM OUTSIDE
COMPETITION
The system of control by collective agreement, as is shown in
the statistics previously set forth, by no means covers the entire
field of employment in Germany. Despite the official imposition
and extension of agreements, the structure of control rests upon
a foundation of voluntary employee organization. The unions
have not as yet succeeded in organizing quite two-fifths of the
employed persons, and collective agreements applied in 1929 to
about four-sevenths of those who were employed. Conse-
quently the protection against outside competition of the wages
and other conditions laid down by agreement continues to pre-
sent a problem to the organizations in many trades and in-
32 TVO. sec. 1; 9 RAG. 140 (Apr. 30, 1930). An agreement between an
employer and a works council has normative force but, unlike the collective
agreement, may be departed from in individual labor contracts. 10 RAG.
407 (Nov. 1, 1930) ; 2 Hueck & Nipperdey, LEHRBUCH DES ARBEITSRECHTS
(Mannheim, 1930) p. 347; Nipperdey, anho. in 8 RAG. at p. 128. The
statement regarding the more limited legal effect of agreements made by
works councils, 15 ST. Louis L. REv. at p. 47, does not seem to represent the
prevailing view.
3 Op. cit. n. 24 above.
3415 ST. Louis L. REv. at p. 8, n. 21.
35Bringmann, FRIEDENSPFLICHT UND TARImnRUCH (Berlin, 1929) 41;
Hueck & Nipperdey, op. cit. n. 32 above, 304; 90 RGZ. 173 (Apr. 24, 1917).
as Compare Nipperdey, anno. to 8 RAG. 128 (1929).
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dustries. Even where an employer has an agreement with a
union, it is an open question, which must be decided upon the
evidence in each case, whether the labor contract of a non-mem-
ber of the union is subject to the agreement; for there is no rule
of law which makes the agreement applicable. 1
As has been noted, 8 the closed union shop has been viewed
with disfavor by the German courts. The Reichscrbeitsge?icht
has recently given expression to the same attitude in a decision
which, although not involving a collective agreement, is suffi-
ciently thoroughgoing to reflect the position of the court with
reference to any arrangement that makes employment condi-
tional upon membership in labor organizations. In the case in
question an action for damages was brought by a discharged
non-union carpenter against thirteen or fourteen members of
various unions with whom he had been employed on a job. Dur-
ing the course of the work the defendants had quit work in a
body without assigning a reason, after frequent efforts to induce
the plaintiff to join a union of his own choosing had failed.
Upon inquiry by the employer, objection to the plaintiff was
assigned by the defendants as the reason for their quitting. No
demand was made for his discharge which, however, followed.
The lower court in deciding for the plaintiff found that the de-
fendants intended by their action to produce the result which
had ensued and that they knew the depressed labor market
would make it difficult for the plaintiff to find another job. The
Reichscrbeitsgericht thus was faced with the problem of recon-
ciling, if possible, the interest of the unions in maintaining con-
trol of employment with the interest of the individual worker
37 9 RAG. 458 (May 24, 1930). Held, where an employer withdraws from
a collective agreement which continues in force as to other employers, there
is no presumption that the agreement applies to the labor contract of a
union member who is hired subsequently. Even where both parties to a
labor contract are members of organizations which have formed a collec-
tive agreement, a worker who conceals his membership under circumstances
which convict him of bad faith will, according to a recent decision, be de-
nied the benefit of the agreement for the period of the concealment. 9 RAG.
496 (Jul. 2, 1930); 10 RAG. 223 (Oct. 22, 1930), repudiating 4 RAG. 379
(Dec. 8, 1928), 15 ST. Louis L. Ruv. at p. 19, n. 52. In the earlier case,
contrary to the statement in the last-cited footnote, the defendant was a
member of the merchants' association which had concluded the collective
agreement.
83 15 ST. Louis L. REV. at p. 29.
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in remaining free from organizations which for one reason or
another are distasteful to him. The case contained no elements
of abuse on the part of the defendants, for they had been care-
ful to present to the employer the simple alternative of dis-
pensing with the plaintiff's services or with theirs, with no
threats of any kind. The plaintiff, moreover, had been allowed
the utmost freedom of choice among union organizations. Never-
theless the court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, giving
utterance in its opinion to the following "principles":
It is an undeniable proposition that the legislative power
has not in any manner, either in the Constitution or in pre-
vious or subsequent social or labor legislation, diminished the
natural freedom of the individual to remain outside of all
economic associations, but on the contrary . . . has ex-
pressly recognized the equal rights of organized and un-
organized workers. . . It should not be overlooked that
the legitimate efforts of the unions to increase their strength
by adding to their membership should be recognized along-
side the freedom of the individual and that in order to give
effect to these efforts a certain amount of pressure upon
unorganized workers in order to induce their assumption
of membership can under some circumstances be employed
and should not lightly be regarded as illegal or wrong...
The coercive powers of organizations or of organized work-
ers, however, reach their obvious limit when a particular
mode of exerting pressure violates the basic principles of
the legal order or involves injury to the opposing party
which is out of all proportion to the benefit being sought
and which leads to unsocial harshness and wrongs. Such
will always be the case when the economic existence of the
* . . weaker, unorganized individual is seriously threat-
ened and endangered by the economically stronger organi-
zation or its members . . . such a mode of dealing runs
counter under any circumstances to the sense of propriety
of all reasonable and right-minded persons.39
Thus the inevitable conflict between individualism and col-
lectivism continues to trouble the courts of Germany as well as
of other countries, and it is once more demonstrated that ex-
plicit legislation is necessary to enable the latter to prevail over
the former upon any important point. Only where the Minister
of Labor has extended a collective agreement is there a full
"6 RAG. 427 (Apr. 24, 1929).
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legal sanction to insure the control of all individual labor con-
tracts by the agreement. In other cases the union must either
continue to strive for the voluntary adherence of workers and
employers or, where an agreement is negotiated or imposed in
conciliation proceedings, seek to incorporate a provision that
would make it the duty of the single employer or the association
with which it contracts to promote the incorporation of the
agreed terms into the individual labor contracts of non-union
workers. Agreements providing for the closed shop and ef-
forts to secure the discharge of non-union employees are illegal.
It is, of course, a question whether any arrangement which ex-
tends the benefits of a collective agreement to workers who do
not support the union that negotiated it is actually a benefit to
the latter or its members;40 yet under the German law there
does not seem to be a satisfactory alternative.
In contrast to the legal limitation upon aggressive union tac-
tics stands the freedom of the employer under an earlier decision
of the Reichsgericht which does not appear to have been de-
parted from. In that case the plaintiff was a union, suing an
employer on account of his successful efforts to compel the resig-
nation of several of the plaintiff's members who were his em-
ployees, which he accomplished by threats of discharge. The
decision was for the defendant despite Article 165 of the Con-
stitution, whereby "The organizations of the two groups of in-
terests [in employment] and the agreements entered into by
them are recognized." This provision, said the court, is not
capable of direct enforcement but requires legislation to carry it
out.41 Article 159 of the Constitution,42 which is the real basis
of "freedom of association" in Germany, is more direct in its
operation. It is, however, taken to mean chiefly that the indi-
vidual is protected in his right to decide whether he will asso-
ciate himself with others and to choose freely the organization
to which he will belong. Accordingly the workers themselves in
the instant case might have sued their employer on account of
40 See 15 ST. Louis L. Rzv. at pp. 45-46.
41113 RGZ. 33 (Feb. 11, 1926).
42 "Freedom to combine for the protection and betterment of their con-
dition of labor and their economic position in general is guaranteed to all
in all occupations. All agreements and measures which tend to restrict or
abrogate that freedom are contrary to law."
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his coercion of them.43 Contracts whereby individuals agree
upon associated action are, also, enforcible."4 But, according to
the court, no right is vested in a trade organization to defend
itself against efforts to alienate its members even when the
doctrine of liability for acts contra bonos mores45 is taken into
account.46 In the case in question there was no collective agree-
ment in force between the union and the defendant. If there
had been, the defendant's acts would have been a breach of his
duty to further its observance. But, paradoxically, no such
duty attaches to employers who merely are members of associa-
tions which conclude collective agreements; for the duty to pro-
mote the observance of such agreements is obligatory in charac-
ter and is limited to the immedate contracting parties. 47
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE GERMAN SYSTEM
In estimating the probability of the continuance of the Ger-
man system of control of employment by collective agreement
it is important to distinguish the factors that arise out of
Germany's present international position from those which are
part of the system itself. The pressure of reparations obliga-
tions and the attendant necessity of cutting production costs in
an effort to export an abnormal quantity of products are, of
course, inconsistent with a system of industrial democracy whose
purpose is to secure to the workers a larger share in the product
of industry. Even if it be conceded that resistance to wage cuts,
which the system makes more possible, is fatal to the nation's
enforced objective, it does not follow that a similar system would
not be successful under more normal circumstances. Indeed,
the maintenance of adequate purchasing power on the part of
consumers, which industrial democracy and collective bargain-
ing promote, appears to be a prime necessity in an economic
4a"A person who infringes a statutory provision intended for others
[Art. 159 of the Constitution] . . . is bound to compensate him for any
damage arising therefrom." BGB. sec. 823. See 15 ST. Louis L. REv. at
p. 39, n. 104 for the operation of the German Bill of Rights.
44111 RGZ. 199 (Jul. 2, 1925).
45 15 ST. Louis L. REv. at p. 13.
46 Nipperdey, DIE GRUNDRECHTE UND GRUNDPFLICHTEN DER REICHSVER-
FASSUNG (1930) contains a detailed discussion of the effect of Art. 159
ard of other legislative measures bearing upon freedom of association.
47 15 ST. LOUIS L. REV. at pp. 12-15 and 42-43.
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system that cannot profitably use or export its accumulations of
capital. Accordingly the failure of the system here under con-
sideration, if it were to come about because of the international
situation, would not indicate that the system was poorly devised
to meet the needs of a rational economic order.
In so far, however, as the sanctions which support control by
collective agreement are inadequate in the face of opposition
arising from more or less normal causes, the system may be said
to be poorly devised. Thus a considerable amouirt of opposition
from employers is to be expected, as well as a tendency on the
part of workers to violate their obligations when such a course
appears to be to their advantage. To meet the foregoing dan-
gers, two sets of safeguards appear to be necessary. A genu-
inely intelligent and fair-minded administration is indispen-
sable. In addition, supporters of the system must develop an
adequate political strategy as well as resort occasionally to legal
remedies if the opposition of some employers is to be kept from
impairing the system. To deal with breaches by the workers, a
general consciousness of the morally binding nature of collective
agreements must go hand in hand with effective legal measures
for checking violations. It is perhaps significant that the sys-
tem has maintained and apparently strengthened itself in Ger-
many for thirteen years and that the principal target of the op-
position, at least for the present, is a feature which probably is
not fundamental. At the same time more effective legal control
over unregistered associations, prohibition of the same organiza-
tion's entering into inconsistent agreements, and more adequate
remedies against employers who use their economic power to
combat labor organizations would seem to be desirable changes.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol17/iss3/1
